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In 2008 Tracey Emin’s short film Homage to Edvard Munch and All My Dead 
Children (1998) was exhibited at the Scottish Gallery of Modern Art in Edinburgh. 
Positioned as the penultimate exhibit in Emin’s first retrospective the film was 
preceded by an emotive repertoire of personal narratives pivoting around Emin’s dual 
identity as successful artist and sexual woman, her creativity born out of the 
pleasures, pains, disappointments and sadnesses of her procreative self. The location 
of the film within the exhibition is important not only because the viewer arrives at 
the work with heightened consciousness of the emotional intensity of Emin’s 
experiences, but because the looped film does not wait patiently for the viewer’s 
arrival, instead calling to the unsuspecting gallery visitor with an almighty scream that 
punctures the relative calm of the preceding two rooms; the contemplative atmosphere 
ruptured by the sound of one woman’s anguish. The notion of spectatorship is 
inadequate for this experience as we are thrown into the midst of Emin’s despair via 
sound rather than image. Through my encounter with the sound-image combination of 
Emin’s film I call into question the concept of spectatorship, which, as Michel Chion 
has argued continues to dominate film studies despite the inextricable link between 
sound and image in both mainstream and avant-garde cinema
i
. Emin’s scream is 
guttural and disconsolate. In the Edinburgh show it could be heard before and beyond 
the imagery. There was a collision of tenses as the irruption of the scream in the 
present tense of my viewing the artworks in the preceding room crashed into the 
anticipation of what I was about to find in the next room.  
 
Homage to Edvard Munch starts with the naked Emin curled up in a foetal position, 
isolated on a wooden jetty at the edge of the Oslo Fjord, which is the location used in 
Munch’s 1893 painting The Scream. The camera pans around the water, which 
glistens in the sunlight. We then hear Emin scream for what feels like an eternity, but 
is in fact less than a minute. On my viewing this induced a momentary panic and an 
exchange of concerned glances amongst strangers in the gallery, an imagined 
community that temporarily shared a feeling of fear that this sound may not have 
emanated from an artwork and may not, therefore, be cloaked in art historical 
reference. Barely resisting the temptation to run to the room in which Homage to 
Edvard Munch was exhibited, I was relieved to discover the sign value of the scream, 
its existence as a textual component of the two minute 10 second Super 8 film. The 
scream endured for longer than it took me to find its source; the imperative to be 
heard not satisfied by the viewer’s presence as the film continues to play on a loop. I 
watched the film several times over, but never lost the feeling of anxiety in the pit of 
my stomach induced by that initial gut-wrenching scream.  
 
In this article I want to argue that the affective resonance of Emin’s film is not solely 
at the level of what is represented (it is not simply a representation of traumatic 
events, although this is also the case), but rather is the occasion for an empathic 
encounter between artist-as-artwork and viewer-collaborator, which is necessarily 
affirmative in its co-emergence of the ‘work’ of art. I ask what an affirmative 
  
encounter with this particular artwork enables us to do. Empathy requires the listener 
to say yes to the one who speaks, to allow space for his or her story and remain open 
to this testimony. It is to say yes to the experience of another rather than treat it with 
suspicion, thus refusing critical models that centre on the veracity of Emin’s work 
(did the event she speaks of really happen, is her art autobiographically accurate?). 
Such models aim to distinguish between story and truth as if unmediated experiences 
were possible in art. Empathy, on the other hand, involves a willingness to affirm the 
story of another and is, therefore, an alternative to the tendency to deconstruct 
experiences as they are figured in texts. An empathic encounter with art does not treat 
the work as a representation of prior experience or something that already exists in the 
world. In remaining open to the testimony of another the audio-viewer is transformed 
into a co-producer of the work, their experiences meeting those of the artist. Thus an 
affirmative engagement with art has a different temporality to representation; as 
something dependent on the one who listens the ‘work’ is emergent, unfinished and 
future-oriented.  
An empathic encounter asks not only what the artwork means, but how it feels as a 
shared responsibility between these two actors. As a researcher, rather than visitor to 
an exhibition, I am interested to explore what it means to empathise with an artwork, 
why this particular film elicits this reaction in me and how this might contribute to an 
affirmative politics of art. Methodologically, I address these questions by putting into 
dialogue my experience of Emin’s film, writing on empathy as this relates to art, and 
theories that engage with the relation between textuality and the ‘real’ in screen-based 
media forms. My intention is to move towards a working definition of empathy that 
takes its cues from the affective pull of Emin’s film. As a key component of this 
development I argue for the ‘inhabitation of difference’ as a necessary condition for 
an empathic encounter with art. 
 
Empathy research has largely been the domain of counseling, psychotherapy, and 
social and developmental psychology. Much of the existing literature on empathy is 
based on the counselor/client relationship. Various definitions follow including 
‘vicarious introspection’ii, temporarily living in the client’s worldiii and ‘transposing 
oneself into the thinking, feeling and acting of another’.iv With the exception of Jill 
Bennett’s important work on empathic vision there is little written about empathy in 
relation to contemporary art.
v
 The relationship between art and empathy does, 
however, emerge within writing on affect, memory and trauma, and this provides a 
conceptual framework that differs from approaches rooted in psychology. 
Nevertheless, there is room for greater consideration of empathy as part of the work 
that art does when approached through affirmation. This article aims to contribute to 
the development of this field.  
 
 
Inhabiting difference 
 
In his recent work on empathy and the position of the witness in screen-based media 
forms John Ellis notes that empathy depends on ‘the attribution of personhood to the 
other in order to be able to feel from their position’.vi In my reaction to Emin’s scream 
I realize that it is not simply a question of how the sound of her pain makes me feel as 
an individual respondent, or a transposition of my feelings on to the work, but a sense 
that I identify with her distress despite not having experienced the trauma of lost 
  
children to which the work refers. I know I cannot feel what she feels, but despite the 
gap in experience (maternal, cultural and sexual) I empathise with her scream and the 
personal story that I have come to know of her life through artworks, television 
appearances, interviews, her feature length film (Top Spot, 2004) and book 
(Strangeland, 2005). I agree with Ellis when he claims that ‘witnesses have to 
recognize the other as being like themselves if they are to experience empathic 
emotions’, but argue that there is a difference between similarity and sameness.vii To 
be like something is not to be it and recognition of this difference is necessary for an 
empathic encounter. The separation between subject and object that exists in the 
encounter with art (albeit sometimes partial or contested) does not fully account for 
the distance that enables my empathic response to Homage to Edvard Munch. After 
all, not all artworks inspire this reaction. There is something specific within the 
narrative of the film that engages my own memories of adolescence and it is in my 
failed desire to bridge the gap between subject and object – to fully identify with the 
artwork – that I acknowledge Emin’s life-force as other to mine.  
 
As I examine why I think I can feel from Emin’s position I begin to question my own 
desire for an empathic relation with the work. I am conscious of the potential for class 
tourism via the spectacle of despair. Emin’s working-class upbringing in Margate is 
not reflected in my own adolescence, which was spent near (but not in) Bournemouth, 
another seaside town on the English south coast. Perhaps my desire to empathise with 
her story of traumatic sexual realisation is a desire for the working-class femininity 
denied in my own adolescence, both geographically and culturally, by growing up in 
the middle-class outskirts of Bournemouth. In a reversal of Beverley Skeggs’ 
argument about the aspiration to middle-class respectable femininity, I now 
understand my teenage frustration at the safe distance separating me from the bright 
lights (most often triggered by inadequate bus timetables) as an acute desire to lose 
middle-class respectability.
viii
 What Emin narrates as the habitual struggles of her 
adolescence from within a seaside town were experienced from outside as a fantasy of 
adventure. The gap that prevents me from claiming Emin’s experience as my own is a 
function of differences in class and geography. This gap amplifies the distance that 
already exists between subject and object, audio-viewer and artwork. Where Emin 
repeatedly narrates her desire to escape the working-class realities of a rundown 
seaside town I have never lost the desire to get in.  
 
The similarity of experience upon which these differences become personally 
meaningful concerns the gendering of memory. The artworks contained within the 
Edinburgh exhibition were about the (re)construction of memories, for example of 
maternal loss, adolescent experience and sexual exploitation. The form of the 
retrospective exaggerates and extends this sense of memory to locate Emin within an 
institutional and art historical framework. The retrospective is an active remembering, 
which simultaneously produces and celebrates an artist’s legacy. However, the 
tradition of the retrospective and the memory-work of Emin’s oeuvre are differently 
gendered. Whereas the retrospective is an art historical trope used to secure the 
dominance of patrilineal control and influence emanating from a celebrated 
individual, the memory-work of Emin’s practice constructs a sense of fragility that 
beckons the experiences of the women who are drawn to the work. It is as though 
Emin relishes the opportunity to have the legitimation of a retrospective bestowed 
upon her so that she can play with the narration of gendered memory (sexual and 
  
artistic) that her work has always focused on. Thus, I empathise with the artwork as 
‘event’, not the artwork as a discrete object. The curatorial decision to position 
Homage to Edvard Munch as the penultimate exhibit in the Edinburgh retrospective, 
such that its sonic properties spill out into the sound-image space of other works, is 
indistinguishable from the gendered pleasure of this particular encounter. 
 
In trying to understand why Emin’s work matters to me I realize that the affirmative 
engagement I hold dear is not only with Emin’s experience, but with my own. My 
reasons for escaping the English south coast are different to Emin’s – where her 
escape was fuelled by humiliation and despair (encapsulated in her scream) mine was 
driven by the desire for other-worldliness. Where she has held on to her childhood 
experiences as a source for her art, my encounter with Emin’s work affirms personal 
regret that I let mine go. They are not alive for me in the way that Emin’s life story is 
for her. I have allowed my memories of this time to fade in an attempt to create my 
life anew. Thus affirmation of Emin’s life-as-work enables a (sometimes painful) 
dialogue between my current and former selves. 
 
The gap between Emin’s experience and my own produces empathy – a realisation of 
the different affects involved (my disappointment, Emin’s pain) – without reducing 
the artist’s experience to my own. In the context of art theory, Jill Bennett draws on 
Gayatri Spivak’s notion of encounter to argue that in giving testimony ‘the difference 
between the one who testifies and the listener is not necessarily eradicated, although it 
may be reduced; it is, more precisely, inhabited’.ix It is by inhabiting the difference in 
experience that an ethics of listening can take place in which the subjectivity of the 
other is affirmed rather than appropriated or subsumed into the experience of the self. 
I am aware of the unbridgeable gap between Emin’s despair and my anxiety; the 
strength of her feeling seems unreachable. Thus, empathy can be understood as a 
near-identification with the feelings of another, but this nearness contains within it a 
distance because to be near something is to be not quite there.   
 
In my reaction to Emin’s film a model of empathy starts to develop which diverts 
from the counselor/client relationship that informs psychological models of empathy 
research. In these approaches the encounter is assumed to be face-to-face and the 
counselor’s empathy is understood as something that will help the client. However, in 
empathising with something on screen the potential for reciprocity is lost because, 
although readings of artworks are at their most powerful when the artwork is treated 
as a fellow subject, my encounter with Homage to Edvard Munch is not subject-to-
subject in the sense of a real time counselor-client relationship. Here we are dealing 
with a different temporality in which the attempt to feel from the position of the other 
has been transposed into the durational movement of the gallery visitor and mediated 
by the expectations, histories and conventions of the artworld. Part of my frustration 
is the knowledge that my empathy will not help Emin. As Ellis argues the mobility of 
vision that characterizes film and television enables us to feel, but comes at the 
expense of being unable to intervene.
x
 I can witness but I cannot act, thus I cannot 
stop the scream or do anything to take away the pain that causes it. Where the 
possibility of action is removed this seems only to increase my level of identification 
with the affective force of the film, if not the specific affect experienced by Emin. The 
possibility of changing the circumstances or mood of another turns out not to be a 
  
prerequisite for empathy. In short, we need a way to theorise empathy outside of the 
potential for impact.  
 
 
 
Temporal complexity 
 
The dominance of formal and semiotic modes of analysis in 20
th
 century European 
and North American art history has foreclosed other approaches to understanding the 
ontological status of art. We are used to asking what and how art means, but less 
inclined to ask how art makes us feel or what art does. The orthodoxy of sign value 
saturates visual practice to the extent that it is difficult to think about art outside of 
textuality and visual language or without this being the default position against which 
others are measured. This perceptual framework situates the artwork as a 
representation to be understood, decoded, challenged and mined for social meaning, 
whilst assuming an absence of the referent. It is deconstructive rather than 
affirmative. This has diverted attention away from a series of other ideas including art 
as process, art as matter and materiality, art as affective encounter and art as empathic 
relation. These ideas provoke forms of temporality that are durational and 
performative; for example, the notion that art brings into being that which it pictures 
suggests a futurity, which differs from the anteriority of representation, its existence 
as a substitute for something else that is already there.
xi
 The language of textuality is 
inadequate in this instance because it cannot grasp the timbre of Emin’s film. Rather 
than only existing as a code to be interpreted Homage to Edvard Munch generates an 
atmosphere to be felt, a palpable sense of loss which is affirmed through my empathy. 
Thus, although useful for the politically important task of deciphering social meaning, 
the temporality inscribed within the logic of representation cannot speak to the 
urgency of Emin’s film, the affective power of which has an equally important 
political resonance if feelings are not to be relegated to the too-often feminised 
category of non-academic discourse.  
 
So what if the gap between signifier and referent collapses such that the absence that 
figures representation is rendered temporarily obsolete. What if rather than standing 
in for something else, a prior reality, art is the real. On my viewing the scream in 
Emin’s film temporarily exceeded representation, thrusting me out of what I know 
into the uncertainty of the as-yet-unknown. For a second the scream punctured both 
the signification of the film (it was the referent) and the institutionalized framing of 
the gallery system. Sound is, however, also representational (the scream functions as a 
signifier), but in the slippage of time between hearing and seeing the ‘event’ of 
Emin’s film a fantasy of transcendence was possible in which the scream could be 
imagined as autonomous and present to itself.
xii
  
 
In one sense it is akin to the punctum, yet whereas Roland Barthes described this as 
‘[an] element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow’ the scream in 
Homage to Edvard Munch feels separated from the imagery both in the temporality of 
its positioning within the retrospective and in the relation of sound to image within 
the film itself.
xiii
 We see Emin’s body and we hear the scream, but do not see Emin 
screaming. Nevertheless, despite the disembodied nature of this scream I feel sure that 
the sound is hers (that she owns it). Neither does the scream emanate as if from a 
  
position off-screen; it is clearly a crucial component of the film and is in no way 
incidental to the imagery. This sonic ambiguity is an example of what Chion calls the 
acousmetre, a sound that is neither wholly inside nor outside the image.
xiv
 The scream 
simultaneously belongs to Emin and exceeds the specificity of her situation, which 
makes it easier for the audio-viewer to identify with an abstracted manifestation of 
anguish. A series of temporal dislocations are apparent between sound and image 
within the film and within the event of my encounter. This slippage sets in motion the 
possibility of an empathic response as I try to grasp the feeling of another only to be 
reminded of the gap between the one who testifies and the one who listens. The 
representational play reminds me of my position as not-Emin (her experience is 
pictured before me) only for the intensity of her scream to plunge me back into the 
fantasy of nearness. Indeed, this lack of instrumentality in Emin’s practice, often mis-
read as lack of control, is precisely why it is so appealing for anyone wishing not to 
master but to immerse her/himself in Emin’s world.  
 
 
Empathy and reproduced image/sound 
 
The scream operates as a catalyst for empathy (who would not at least try to imagine 
why it has come to this), but is never completely recouped into visual language 
despite the many ways in which the film reminds the viewer of its sign function. The 
imagery is seductive, emphasizing the surfaceness of the water until it fills the screen 
as pattern overlaid with the sound of lapping waves. The sea, however, is only 
visually recognizable as the light dances across it – it is surface rather than substance 
– and no attempt has been made to hide the refraction of light through the camera 
lens: it is filmed sea. There are also aesthetic references. Emin’s pose is reminiscent 
of Edward Weston’s photographs of Tina Modotti and the location of Munch’s 
Expressionist painting is rendered cinematic in its appeal to what might be lost at sea. 
The call to particular photographic, painterly and filmic tropes, practices and 
techniques heightens the mediated aspect of the film as if this ought to remind us of 
its signifying function, its reference to something outside of itself, and thus act as a 
defense against the affective power of the scream. However, as I continue to try to 
feel from Emin’s position I realize that this recuperation is incomplete. I cannot 
confine the film to its sign value and the textuality of the work only partially protects 
me from the irruption of the scream.  
 
The propensity of screen media to be experienced as both intensely felt and textual 
sign is explored by Ellis who notes the ‘thereness’ of recorded sound and image, its 
felt effect, despite our knowledge of its textuality.
xv
 Far from disenfranchising affect 
textuality can render it more real, increasing its thereness, because in re-presenting an 
affect via film it is affirmed in the here and now of our viewing and hearing. In this 
sense Emin’s scream is multi-directional in its temporality referring simultaneously to 
events remembered from the past, the artist’s enduring experience of anguish and the 
present tense of our encounter with the film. For me this encounter is marked by my 
desire for proximity to the real, a yearning to bring things closer both visually and 
affectively. In his work on liveness and mediatization Philip Auslander has argued 
that the increased level of intimacy offered by screen-based media forms is now so 
inculcated in everyday expectations of what constitutes the real that it is habitually 
included in live performances.
xvi
 Close-ups on large screens at football matches, for 
  
example, picture what the naked eye cannot see thus compensating for the 
disappointment of the real. There is, following Auslander, a complex relationship 
between representation and intimacy in which the absence of the referent becomes a 
mechanism by which affective power is increased rather than diminished. Auslander 
shows us that screen-based representations are not necessarily counter-affectual and 
can often be closer to what we experience as the real. My enduring preference for 
Emin’s films over her drawings or monoprints, which have been problematically 
understood as a more direct form of expression, attests to Auslander’s argument.xvii 
Furthermore, my preference for the sound of Emin’s recorded voice over the 
experience of hearing her speak live, fascinating though this is, speaks to the same 
point. My sense of empathy with Emin’s affective repertoire is heightened when 
experienced through reproduced image or sound. It is not dependent on a real-time 
encounter. 
 
Some recent literature within what we might call the affective turn has tended to 
celebrate affects’ capacity to move beyond representation, but I wish to distinguish 
between this claim and the argument proposed here in which the film moves in and 
out of different temporal registers. Simon O’Sullivan, for example, reads affect as a 
welcome departure from the orthodoxy of semiotic, interpretive and deconstructivist 
approaches to art.
xviii
 Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, O’Sullivan argues for an 
understanding of art as affirmative practice. This is an exciting prospect. However, 
the temporality of the model proposed in which affect is understood as the answer to 
the inability of social determinism to deal with the unpredictable, the unexpected or 
the ‘texture’ of social experience is itself problematic when read through the dynamic 
of Emin’s practice. The idea of art beyond representation suggests a displacement 
activity and leads to the countering of affect celebration with affect repulsion; for 
example, a fear amongst some feminist scholars that affect celebration corresponds to 
a waning of interest in feminist critical methodologies, in particular those informed by 
notions of ideology and textuality.
xix
 However, the paradox of the work of art that 
moves between the anteriority of representation and the present tense of empathy 
belies a clear distinction between affect and textuality.  
 
 
The work of affirmation 
 
By engaging with Emin’s film as an affirmative encounter the beginnings of a new 
conceptual vocabulary for studying empathic relations with art comes into view. This 
includes the inhabiting of difference, the incomplete recuperation of affect into the 
logic of representation, the production of intimacy via the rhetoric of the screen, and 
the productive complexity of tenses. 
 
If empathy is a partially failed attempt to feel from the position of the other it suggests 
a belief in the possibility of change, an affirmative encounter made possible by the 
movement between what-is and what is set before me as a picture, real-time affect and 
textuality. The film metaphorically enacts a changing of perspective, zooming out 
such that it is objectified as a representation, then zooming in so close that I am 
implicated in the work through my necessarily failed attempt to live, albeit 
temporarily, in Emin’s world. 
 
  
The labour involved in creating the conditions for empathy, whether fulfilled or not, 
calls to mind Barbara Bolt’s important observation that ‘The ‘work’ that art does, is 
categorically not the object – painting, sculpture, drawing, print and so on – that we 
have come to call an artwork’.xx Homage to Edvard Munch is a powerful film, but this 
power does not derive from its status as an artwork in the sense of an object or entity 
amenable to categorisation. The work involved in affirming Emin’s experience is 
carried out both by the artist and audio-viewer in a form of co-creativity. It is not 
straightforward or effortless. On the contrary the weight of no-saying that surrounds 
art criticism, derived from Marxist methodologies that focus on ideological motives 
and structural conditions, makes yes-saying a difficult task. It is to work against the 
tide of rhetoric about progress and intellectual rigour in art and analysis. In addition, 
the discursive construction of Emin in particular as self-obsessed, lacking control or 
self restraint (creatively and sexually), as a bad artist or not even an artist at all makes 
this a peculiarly challenging prospect. There are constant reminders of why we should 
say no to Emin. However, the reluctance to say yes to Emin’s work and experience, 
for fear of appearing celebratory and uncritical, severely limits our encounter with her 
art. This only makes affirmation as a form of critical engagement more imperative. 
To say yes in the way I have proposed requires a temporary aligning of self to other, a 
partial loss of distance more commonly associated with complicity than critique. It is 
an additive process, not a deconstructive project. To affirm someone else’s experience 
risks the loss of critical distance, but it is a risk worth taking in the interests of 
conceptualising other ways of understanding our encounter with art. An empathic 
relation opens up new questions such as who occupies which position. The roles of 
critic, artist, audio-viewer and witness shift within the dialogue between my 
experience and Emin’s such that there is no privileged position from which the art 
event emerges and no sovereign voice of the critic. It is a performative process that 
cannot be reduced to a single authored text. 
The empathy that draws me close to the film, whilst simultaneously emphasizing the 
distance between my experience and Emin’s, is gendered at both a literal and 
methodological level. It is not surprising that maternal loss elicits a gendered 
empathic response. However, the fear of the referent – the idea that Emin’s scream 
does not represent something else but is the real – discloses the masculinist anxiety of 
visual culture studies in which proximity negates mastery and female sexuality cannot 
be held safely at a distance. Despite the ubiquity of representationalist thinking Emin 
is screaming. 
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